At 4:40, FAB6560 descended through 1000 feet above field elevation. Between 4:40 and 4:41, the captain issued instructions to complete the configuration for landing, and the FO made several statements regarding aircraft navigation and corrective action.

At 4:41, the crew reported 3 nm final for Runway 35T. The CYRB tower controller advised that the wind was now estimated to be 150°T at 7 knots, cleared FAB6560 to land Runway 35T, and added the term “check gear down” as required by the NAV CANADA Air Traffic Control Manual of Operations (ATC MANOPS) Canadian Forces Supplement.

FAB6560's response to the tower (4:41) was cut off, and the tower requested the crew to say again. There was no further communication with the flight. The tower controller did not have visual contact with FAB6560 at any time.

4:41 FO states “Just over the shoreline.”
4:41 Pitch begins to increase from −5°
4:41 FO calls captain by first name; states “I don't like this.”
4:41 GPWS: “Sink rate”
4:41 FO states “Go for it.”
4:41 GPWS: “Minimums”
4:41 FO states “Go around.”
4:41 GPWS: “Minimums”
4:41 Captain calls “Go-around thrust.” 

At 4:41, as the flight crew initiating a go-around, FAB6560 collided with terrain about 1 nm east of the midpoint of the CYRB runway. Brian MacDonald, lead investigator said “this accident was the product of a complex series of events, all of them lining up together.’ 

The reported indicated that “the captain’s mental model was likely that the approach and landing could be salvaged, and the (first officer’s) mental model was almost certainly that there was significant risk to the safety of flight and that a go-around was required.” The report also stated the copilot was not “sufficiently assertive” in making his case to abort the landing. The report went on to state “given the captain’s workload and mental model, it is likely that only clear and unambiguous information would have succeeded in changing his understanding of the situation and his course of action.”